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INDEPENDENT REPRESENTATION FOR
CORPORATE DEFENDANTS IN DERIVATIVE SUITS*
The role of counsel for the corporation in derivative litigation has received
scant attention. It is unclear whether an attorney may properly represent
both the corporation and any directors or officers named as individual de-
fendants in the suit. The Canons of Ethics state that attorneys should neither
represent clients whose interests are adverse, nor compromise the confidences
of present or former clients.' Nevertheless, dual representation of corporate
and insider defendants has frequently occurred, 2 in part because the directors
and officers usually select corporate counsel, and in part because the nature
of the corporation's interests and the scope of its role in the derivative action
are surrounded by confusion. Under American procedure the corporation
is joined as a party defendant;8 yet it will receive any benefit or recovery
resulting from a successful prosecution of the suit.4 Furthermore, while the
corporation is usually only a nominal party,5 in certain circumstances it is
*Lewis v. Shaffer Stores, 218 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
1. AERcAir BAR ASSocrATION, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs 6 & 37 (1957).
2. It is difficult to determine precisely how frequently this practice occurs. Washing-
ton and Bishop state that the corporation and individual insider defendants "often" retail
common counsel. WASHINGTON & BISHOP, INDEMNIFYING THE CoRPoRATE EXECUTIvE 37,
41 (1963) [hereinafter cited as WASHINGTON & BIsHOP]. Hornstein implies that the prac-
tice is fairly common. 2 HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAY AND PRAcTice § 714 (1959, Supp.
1964) [hereinafter cited as HORNSTEIN]. An examination of reported derivative suits also
indicates that instances in which the insider defendants and the corporation were repre-
sented by the same counsel are numerous indeed. However, in a majority of cases, the
corporate and individual defendants appear to have been separately represented.
Dual representation may occur in several forms. A single attorney or firm of attorneys
may be the sole counsel representing both the individual and corporate defendants. Alter-
natively, counsel for the corporation may only assist in the insiders' defense. Such is the
case when the insiders also retain outside counsel to represent their interests. The ethical
problems are much the same in both situations, and the term "dual representation" is in-
tended to include both variants of the practice.
3. 2 HoRusisnS r § 714; Groel v. United Elec. Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 616, 625, 61 Atd. 1061,
1064 (Ch. 1904); General Inv. Corp. v. Addinsell, 255 App. Div. 319, 7 N.Y.S.2d 377,
motion for rearguinent denied, 255 App. Div. 962, 8 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1938). See notes 27-28
infra.
4. Taormin v. Taormin Corp., 32 Del. Ch. 18, 78 A2d 473 (Ch. 1951); Keenan v,
Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 2 A.2d 904 (1938). Cf. Clarke v. Greenberg, 296 N.Y. 146, 71
N.E.2d 443 (1947). Only in exceptional circumstances have courts allowed the complainant
to recover a pro rata amount of the sum recoverable. See Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F2d
173, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955); Matthews v. Headley Chocolate Co., 130 Md. 523,
100 AUt. 645 (1917).
5. E.g., Leven v. Birrell, 92 F. Supp. 436, 444-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) ; Meyers v. Smith,
190 Minn. 157, 251 N.W. 20 (1933); Chaplin v. Selznick, 186 Misc. 66, 58 N.Y.S.2d
453 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
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allowed to take an active role in the litigation, which may range from out-
right aid to the plaintiff 6 to defense on the merits.7
The question of the propriety of dual representation was sharply pre-
sented in a recent derivative suit, Lewis v. Slzaffer Stores.8 The action was
brought by a stockholder of the R. C. Williams Company against the officers,
directors and a majority shareholder of the corporation. The thrust of the
complaint was two-fold: to recover short-swing profits made by the indi-
vidual defendants in the purchase and sale of Williams' securities, and to
recover losses allegedly suffered by Williams as a result of certain transactions
initiated under the defendants' control. A large New York City law firm,
which had been counsel to Williams for many years, appeared on behalf of
the corporation and the individual defendants and filed a joint answer denying
the charges of wrongdoing. At this juncture, the complaining shareholder
moved to strike the company's answer and to strike the appearance of the
law firm as counsel for Williams. Plaintiff further demanded that the com-
pany appear by "genuinely independent counsel."0
The court acceded to the plaintiff's request that the dual representation
of parties defendant be discontinued, and ordered that Williams "retain inde-
pendent counsel, who have had no previous connection with the corporation,
to advise it as to the position which it should take in this controversy."10 In
a brief opinion Judge McLean first noted that he had no doubt that the law
firm in question believed "in good faith" that the suit was without merit.'
From this remark, it may be inferred that the firm, and perhaps the court,
considered the interests of the corporation and individual defendants to be
so completely merged in cases in which the plaintiff has no valid cause
of action that counsel could represent both clients with clear conscience. But
pointing to the plaintiff's vigorous contention that the suit was meritorious,
Judge McLean reasoned that the court "cannot and should not attempt to
pass upon the merits at this stage."' 2 Consequently, he grounded his decision
to require separate counsel on the fact that, "upon the face of the complaint,"
the interests of the officers, directors and majority shareholders were "clearly
adverse.., to the interests of the stockholders other than defendants." 13 Since
such adversity of interest is typically manifested in shareholders' complaints,
and since most courts will be equally reluctant to reach the merits at an early
6. Block v. Propp, 174 Misc. 122, 19 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
7. Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.T., 57 F. Supp. 6S0 (E.D. Pa. 1944).
8. 218 F. Supp. 238-(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
9. Id. at 239. The plaintiff also asked the court to limit the answer to be filed by the
independent counsel to a mere "invitation to the plaintiff to prove his case to the end that
the corporation receive any benefits to which it is entitled." Ibid.
10. Id. at 240. The court pointedly refused to allow the plaintiff to dictate the nature
of the answer to be filed by the independent counsel.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid. Compare Smith v. Sperllng, 354 U.S. 91, 95 (1956).
13. Lewis v. Shaffer Stores, 218 F. Supp. 238, 23940 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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stage, adoption of the Lewis court's ethical viewpoint would bar dual repre-
sentation in most derivative actions.
It cannot be said, however, that Lewis reflects the uniform position regard-
ing the propriety of counsel representing both corporate and individual de-
fendants.14 The earlier approach of the courts was characterized by a marked
reluctance to disturb the practice of dual representation in derivative suits.1"
The reason given was that the corporation has the right to "select such counsel
as it chooses."'10 The first major retreat from this tolerant attitude was the
decision of the New York Appellate Division in Garlen v. Green Mansions,
T1c. 17 In that case it was held that when relief sought in a shareholder's com-
plaint requires an active appearance and answer by the corporation, such
appearance must be by independent counsel. This rule, which may be read
to permit dual representation in the more usual case where the corporation
is only a nominal party, is now generally followed in the State of New York.18
Since the Garlen decision in 1959, there has been an increasing sensitivity
to the possible conflict of interest generated by dual representation in deriva-
tive litigation, and a definite movement towards a more complete prohibition
of the practice is discernible. The Lewis case, of course, is the most striking
example of this trend. In addition, the influential Committee on Professional
Ethics of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York has stated in
Opinion 842 that
a conflict of interests is inherent in any [derivative] action whenever
relief is sought on behalf of the corporation against the individual director-
officer defendants, and that in such cases Canon 6 precludes one firm from
representing both the corporation and the individual director-officer de-
fendants except in unusual circumstances stemming from particular facts
in a given case.' 9
14. The variety of judicial treatment of dual representation is stressed in Tockman,
The Position of Corporate Comnsel in Derivative Actions, 51 ILL. B.J. 654, 659-60 (1963),
and Osborn, Developments in Corporate Law, 19 Bus. LAW. 577 (1964).
15. See Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 57 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Pa. 1944); Hornsby
v. Lohmeyer, 364 Pa. 271, 72 A2d 294 (1950).
16. Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., mspra note 15, at 684. The Otis court also ques-
tioned a shareholder's standing to object to the corporation's choice of counsel, on grounds
that the shareholder had never sustained a relationship of confidence to the attorneys ]u
question. Ibid. However, the requirement of an attorney-client relationship should not be
allowed to bar a shareholder from challenging the adequacy of the corporation's repre-
sentation in a derivative suit brought against directors and officers. The insider defendants
can hardly be expected to complain that it is improper for the corporation's counsel to
represent their own personal interests. Thus, prohibiting the shareholder's objection to
dual representation is generally tantamount to prohibiting any effective objection in behalf
of the corporation.
17. 9 App. Div. 2d 760, 193 N.Y.S2d 116 (1959) (per curiam).
18. See Kelley v. 74 & 76 West Tremont Ave. Corp., 24 Misc. 2d 370, 198 N.Y.S.2d
721 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
19. 15 REcoRD or N.Y.C.B.A. 80 (1960). The statement cited expresses the majority
view of the Committee. It should be noted that Opinion 842 overruled portions of a pre-
vious opinion issued in 1936, which stated that
there seems to be no .objection to the attorney's representing both the corporation
and the directors in the [derivative] action, provided, of course, that there is no
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Recent cases before Chancellor Seitz in the Chancery Court of Delavare 20
and Judge Washington in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 2 also indicate
that the corporate and individual defendants should be separately represented2
In sum, if the complaining shareholder of the future makes an objection to
counsel's representation of both corporate and insider defendants, there is
a good chance his motion will be granted. Two further points warrant em-
phasis. First, if the shareholder delays in raising his objection, the courts
will be considerably less receptive to his plea; in a number of cases the courts
have refused to bar dual representation essentially because the plaintiff waited
until late in the proceedings before asking that the corporation be separately
representedP2 Second, the practice of dual representation undoubtedly con-
tinues. And in cases where the complaining shareholder voices no objection,
courts have yet to demonstrate a willingness to require independent counsel
sua sponte.
In view of this developing trend towards the prohibition of dual represen-
tation in derivative suits, it is appropriate to examine more closely the factors
which allegedly render the practice unethical. The problem, of course, is not
the interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, for Canons 6 and 37 adequately
set forth the relevant strictures against representing conflicting interests and
compromising clients' confidences.2 4 On the contrary, the essential problem
conflict of interest between the corporation and the directors represented by him.
CoM mITTEE oN PROFEssIoNAr. ETHICS OF THE ASSOcIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CrY OF
NEW YORK AND THE NEW YoRx COUNTY LAwYERS' AssocIATION, OPINION 363 (1956).
20. Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Dorsey Corp., 182 A2d 647, 654 (Del. Ch. 1962).
21. Murphy v. Washington Am. League Baseball Club, Inc., 324 F2d 394, 393 (D.C.
Cir. 1963).
22. See also Milone v. English, 306 F.2d 814 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Under the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 535 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 501
(b) (Supp. II, 1959-60), a union member may initiate a suit in behalf of his union against
any union officers who have been derelict in their duty. The act clearly confers rights
upon members which resemble a shareholder's right to maintain a derivative action against
corporate management. Thus, it is significant that the court in Milone said:
Counsel who are chosen by and represent officers charged with misconduct, and who
also represent the union, are not able to guide the litigation in the best interest of
the union because of the conflict in counsel's loyalties. In such a situation it would
be incumbent upon counsel not to represent both the union and the officers.
Id. at 817. Accord, Com.urnEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE AssocA.TION OF THE
BAR OF THE CrT oF NEW YoRs, OPnIoNw 843, 15 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 139 (1960).
23. Solomon v. Hirsch, 35 Misc. 2d 716, 230 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Kelley
v. 74 & 76 West Tremont Ave. Corp, 24 Misc. 2d 370, 198 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Sup. Ct. 1960) ;
Hausman v. Bucldey, 299 F.2d 696 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 885 (1962); Selama-
Dindings Plantations, Ltd. v. Durham, 216 F. Supp. 104 (S.D. Ohio 1963). See Marco v.
Dulles, 169 F. Supp. 622, 632 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dimnissed, 268 F2d 192 (2d Cir. 1959),
where it is pointed out that "a motion to disqualify [counsel] is of an equitable nature. A
party making such a motion should do so with reasonable diligence and promptness after
the facts have become known to it."
24. Canon 6 reads in part:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of
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is one of applying the generalized principles enunciated in the canons to the
specific context of the derivative suit. An initial difficulty is created by the
complex interrelationships that exist between an attorney and the shareholders,
directors and officers who comprise the corporation. It seems clear that a
conceptualization of the corporation as a separate entity capable of treatment
as an ordinary client ignores these relationships and consequently results in
too simplistic a resolution of the ethical issue of dual representation. Nowhere,
in fact, is the fallacy of treating the corporation as an ordinary client more
clearly demonstrated than in reference to the consent provisions contained
in Canons 6 and 37. These provisions permit representation of conflicting
interests or possible disclosure of confidences upon the informed and express
consent of all concerned. But it would be meaningless in derivative litigation
to allow the consent of the parties defendant to exculpate the practice of dual
representation, for most often it would be the defendant directors and officers
who would force the corporation's consent. Indeed, Opinion 842 pointedly
warns that the "unique relationship existing between the corporation and its
directors is such that extreme caution should be exercised in resorting to the
'consent' provisions .... ,,25
Because of the inadequacies of the concept of the corporation as an entity,
an inquiry into the propriety of dual representation must "pierce the corporate
veil" and determine the real nature of the confidences and interests of the
corporate client. Viewed in this light, the hazard that dual representation
this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client,
it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge
his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or em-
ployment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with
respect to which confidence has been reposed.
Canon 37 essentially reiterates the precept set forth in the last paragraph of Canon 6:
It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences. This duty outlasts
the lawyer's employment, and extends as well to his employees; and neither of them
should accept employment which involves or may involve the disclosure or use of
these confidences, either for the private advantages of the lawyer or to the disad-
vantage of the client, without his knowledge and consent, and even though there are
other available sources of such information. A lawyer should not continue employ-
ment when he discovers that his obligation prevents the performance of his full duty
to his former or to his new client.
AzxERICAN BAR AssocATiON, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1957).
The canons are given the force of statutory law in many jurisdictions. E.g., S.D.N.Y.
General Rule 5(c), 16 FED. RuLzs S.Rv. 903 (1952). Prohibitions similar to those con-
tained in Canons 6 and 37 are also incorporated in various state statutes regulating the
conduct of the Bar, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e); § 6076, Rules 5 & 7.
But irrespective of the Canons or statutory enactment, courts are justified in prohibit-
ing counsel from representing conflicting interests or violating a client's confidence, for
such practices are clearly violative of public policy. See In re Boone, 83 Fed. 944, 952
(N.D. Cal. 1897). See generally DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 59-60 (1953) [hereinafter cited
as DRiNKER].
25. 15 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 80 (1960).
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may lead counsel to violate the confidences of his corporate client seems
largely academic. In most cases, the confidences between the corporation and
its counsel are totally accessible to director and officer defendants. For this
reason, a concern that counsel will act as a conduit for corporate confidences
is unrealistic. Equally illusory is the potential for breached confidences when
former or present corporate counsel undertake to represent only the insider
defendants in a derivative suit. This precise question was considered in Lewis
v. Shaffer Stores. Significantly, although dual representation vms ruled improper
in that case, the law firm was allowed to continue its representation of the
individual defendants. The court saw "no impropriety" in such representation,
especially since the firm felt an "obligation to defend the officers and directors
whom it has advised. 2 6 This holding indicates that the policy that an attorney
stand by his client is a more pressing goal than a mechanical application of
Canon 37 and re-emphasizes the point that the danger that corporate confi-
dences may be channelled through counsel to director-officer defendants is
minimal indeed.
A more tangible ethical problem of dual representation is presented by
the possibility of a conflict of interest between the corporation and the indi-
vidual defendants. The fact that, under American procedure, the corporation
is joined as a defendant is a product of the historical development of the
derivative suit.2 This alignment, however, does not necessarily reflect the
theoretical interests of the corporation. 28 The corporation is the ultimate re-
cipient of any benefit or recovery that may be derived from the suit; it stands
to gain at the expense of the individual defendants. Thus, in the theoretical
model of the derivative suit, a counsel who undertakes dual representation
violates the mandate of Canon 6, since "in behalf of one client it is his duty
to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose."
It may seem, however, that a finding of impropriety based on this inherent
conflict of interest fails to take into account the realities of derivative litigation.
In the first place, the mechanism of the derivative suit is undoubtedly abused.
The well known Wood Survey revealed that the strike suitor - eager to trade
his nuisance value for a quick and secret settlement - may have been the
26. Lewis v. Shaffer Stores, 218 F. Supp. 238, 239 (1963); accord, Marco v. Dulles,
169 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal disnissed, 268 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1959).
27. The alignment of the corporation as a defendant was probably dictated by the
traditional reluctance in American theory to allow an unwilling litigant to be brought in
as a plaintiff. 2 HoRaus=an § 714.
28. It is significant that it is the customary English practice to align the corporation
as a party plaintiff. Duckett v. Glover, 6 Ch. D. 82 (1877). Furthermore, among many
commentators, and in the federal courts, there has been pressure to align the corporation
as a plaintiff when it appears that it is not truly antagonistic to the shareholder's cause.
See Sullivan, The Federal Courts as an Effective Forum in Shareholders' Derivative
Actions, 22 LA. L. REv. 580, 595 (1962). See generally 3 Moomn FEDERuL PnAcrzcE
23.21 (2d ed. 1963). But see Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957), and a companion
case, Swanson v. Traer, 354 U.S. 114 (1957).
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rule rather than the exception prior to 1944.29 Although many jurisdictions
have placed considerable obstacles in the path of the litigious shareholder, 0
strike suits remain prevalent.3 ' Secondly, opinions abound with the statement
that the corporation is only a nominal or neutral party in derivative actions.32
It may be argued from these premises that it is unreasonable and wastefully
expensive to require separate counsel to represent the corporate and individual
defendants, because their interests are in virtual harmony whenever the action
is without merit, and because the corporation will remain a neutral party
whose counsel is generally unable to alter the outcome of the litigation. To
allow the shareholder to force the corporation and the individual defendants
into the burdensome procedure of retaining independent counsel will accomplish
little and merely adds another weapon to the arsenal of the strike suitor.
On the other hand, it must be realized that in a significant number of deriva-
tive suits the corporation actually assumes an active role. For example, in
a number of instances corporations have aided the plaintiff shareholder by
assisting in the prosecution of the claim.33 Alternatively, the corporation may
set up certain procedural defenses that may be "practically as prejudicial to
the plaintiff's chances of success as an active defense on the merits."3 4 Thus,
the corporation may object to lack of proper service,m complain of misjoinder
of causes of action,86 move that the plaintiff be required to post security-
for-expenses 3 7 or allege that demand on the directors or shareholders was
29. WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERs' DRvATIVE SuiTs (1944).
The prevalence of strike suits at the time of the survey is indicated by Wood's finding
that "the ratio of recoveries to dismissals in cases involving publicly held corporations Is
approximately I to 17; in those involving closely held corporations this ratio is only about
1 to 4." Id. at 7. The findings of the survey, however, have been severely criticized, See
Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in Newt York, 32 CALU'.
L. REv. 123 (1944).
30. In force in New York, for example, is a security-for-expenses statute, N.Y. Bus.
CoRP. LAw § 627 (1963), and a requirement of contemporaneous stock ownership, N.Y.
Bus. CoRP. LAw § 626(b) (1963).
31. Although rules such as FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) have largely eliminated opportunities
for secret settlement, the lucrative fees awarded plaintiff's counsel, which often amount to
20 per cent of the fund recovered for the corporation, remain a substantial inducement to
shareholder suits. See generally Hornstein Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor itt
Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARv. L. Rxv. 658 (1956); Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in
Shareholders Derivative Suits, 39 CoLum. L. Rav. 784 (1939).
32. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
33. Block v. Propp, 174 Misc. 122, 19 N.Y.S2d 895 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Sheridan v,
Sheridan Elec. Light Co., 38 Hun. 396 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1886); cf. Silverman v. Re, 194
F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
34. WASHINGTON & BISHor 49. See generally Washington, Stockholders' Derivative
Suits: The Company's Role and a Suggestion, 25 CORNELL L.Q. 361 (1940); Note, De-
fenses in Shareholders' Derivative Suits - Who May Raise Them, 66 HArv. L. Rv. 342
(1952).
35. Carruthers v. Jack Waite Mining Co., 306 N.Y. 136, 116 N.E2d 286 (1953).
36. Brock v. Poor, 216 N.Y. 387, 111 N.E. 229 (1915).
37. Generally, only the corporation can move to compel security. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAw § 627.
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absent or inadequate. 8 Finally, in certain circumstances - which a permissive
judiciary has allowed to expand considerably - the corporation may be
allowed to enter what is in effect an active defense on the merits.!* Such a
defense might be permissible where the complaint seeks to enjoin the perfor-
mance of contracts,40 or seeks to interfere with a corporate reorganization,41
or prays for the appointment of a receiver.2 The range of possible corporate
responses to derivative actions and the obvious fact that corporate harassment
of the plaintiff is of great advantage to the accused insiders places an attorney
who represents both corporate and individual defendants in an ambivalent
position. Certainly it is an important function of counsel to advise the cor-
poration regarding its proper stance in the controversy.43 But can an attorney
render truly impartial advice to the corporate client where the interests of
his individual clients will inevitably be affected by the character of the cor-
poration's response to the suit?" This problem is in no way lessened by the
frequency of strike suits, for counsel must still distinguish between these
and truly meritorious actions, and in making this distinction counsel must
remain free from any bias in favor of his individual clients. 5
The practical difficulties with dual representation extend beyond counsel's
advisory function. There is of course the striking conflict of interest that
would be created by counsel's representing all parties defendant in a meri-
torious cause of action. A less obvious, but equally important, problem arises
at the crucial stage of settlement, where a major portion of derivative actions
is concluded. 46 It is at this stage that the adversary process is most likely
to break down. When cases are brought to trial, the plaintiff's counsel can
generally be relied upon to represent shareholder interests by vigorous prose-
38. Quirke v. St Louis-S. F. Ry., 277 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1960).
39. E.g., Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R, 57 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Pa. 1944); Blish
v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 538, 64 A.2d 581 (Sup. Ct. 1948). See
authorities cited notes 40-42 infra.
40. Kirby v. Schenck, 25 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
41. Corey v. Independent Ice Co., 226 Mass. 391, 115 N.E. 488 (1917).
42. Esposito v. River Sand & Gravel Co., 287 Mass. 185, 191 N.E. 363 (1934) ; Godley
v. Grandall & Godley Co, 181 App. Div. 75, 168 N.Y.S. 251 (1917).
43. Significantly, Opinion 842 stresses the importance of separate counsel at the crucial
period in which the corporation must determine its role in the controversy:
[W]herever the facts are such as to make it improper for the same attorney to
represent both classes of defendants throughout such an action, it would be equally
improper for the same attorney to represent the two classes of defendants even for
a short period of time.
15 RcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 80, 81 (1960).
44. It must be realized that, in situations of dual representation, there is a natural
tendency for counsel to favor the interests of his individual clients. Since the officers and
directors usually select corporate counsel, an attorney who gives preference to the in-
animate body corporate will run the risk of being dismissed by both corporate and in-
dividual clients.
45. See Milone v. English, 306 F.2d 814, 817 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
46. See Hornstein, The Death Kitell of Stockholders Derivative Suits in New York,
32 Ca=n. L. R-v. 123, 127-28 (1944).
1965]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
cution of the corporation's cause of action. But at settlement the probability
that plaintiff's counsel will be interested only in obtaining a lucrative fee may
undermine his capacity to represent adequately the corporation's shareholders.
Although the measure of counsel's compensation is dependant upon the size
of the fund recovered for the corporation, the skill and the amount of time
expended by counsel are limiting factors in determining his fee,47 Past a
certain point, any increases in the fund recovered for the corporation may
not significantly increase the fees awarded counsel; otherwise counsel's com-
pensation would be wholly out of proportion to the services he has rendered.
Thus, the incentive of plaintiff's counsel to press for the largest possible re-
covery for the corporation may be diminished.48 At this juncture, where
plaintiff's counsel and the individual defendants have a common interest
in the quick termination of settlement negotiations, the character of the corpo-
ration's representation assumes crucial importance. If the same counsel rep-
resents both the corporation and the director and officer defendants, the in-
terests of the corporation are likely to receive insufficient protection. An in-
creased recovery for the corporation is wholly incompatible with the goal of
limiting the defendants' liability. Defendants' counsel is thus placed in an
untenable position, and more often than not he will succumb to the pressure
to approve any settlement between the shareholder and his individual clients.
On the other hand, where the corporation is separately represented, it is more
likely that counsel will reach an independent judgment regarding the merits
of any settlement proposal. Should counsel then conclude that the settlement
is inadequate, he may be able to force the defendants to increase the sum to
be paid the corporation. At the very least, where notice to shareholders or
court approval of settlement is required,49 an independent counsel will be
able to draw attention to inadequacies in the settlement agreement,50
In addition to the ethical impropriety of dual representation, a major diffi-
culty with the practice occurs in the context of indemnification of corporate
executives. Generally, directors or officers found guilty in a derivative suit
47. Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 221 F. Supp. 55, 61 (D. Mass. 1963).
48. See Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J,
dissenting).
49. E.g., Fm. R. Civ. P. 23(c); ARiz. R. Civ. P. 23(c); TFXAs R. Civ. P. 42(d).
See Whitten v. Dabney, 171 Cal. 621, 631-32, 154 Pac. 312, 316 (1915) ; Spellacy v. Su-
perior Court, 23 Cal. App. 2d 142, 72 P.2d 262 (1937).
50. An equally useful role could be performed by an independent counsel with regard
to the compensation allowed plaintiff's attorney. As suggested in Cherner v. Transitron
Electronic Corp., 221 F. Supp. 55, 61 (D. Mass. 1963), the shareholders may not have
adequate means to object to the size of the fees awarded plaintiff's counsel. In such In-
stances the adversary process cannot be relied upon to keep the fees within reasonable
bounds, for the defendants may be indifferent to the percentage of the damages which will
be diverted to complainant's counsel. Clearly, an independent counsel responsible only to
the corporation would be more willing, and better able, to challenge excessive counsel fee
awards than an attorney who had also undertaken the representation of the individual
defendants.
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cannot be reimbursed by the corporation for the expense of their defense. 1
But if the same counsel represents both the corporate and insider defendants,
it is difficult to segregate legal services performed for the corporation from
those performed on behalf of the insiders. Thus the corporation may readily
finance the insiders' defense by paying a proportionately larger share of the
legal expenses than is merited by its role in the litigation. The pressure to
use dual representation as a means to transfer the insiders' defense expenses
to the corporation has undoubtedly been lessened by the trend toward greater
liberality in statutory indemnification provisions. The Delaware Act r,3 and
the Model Corporation Actr for example, provide the corporation with a
virtual carte blanche in providing for indemnification of executives.P Never-
theless, the indemnification problem in situations of dual representation re-
tains considerable vitality. Although the indemnification statutes generally
do not allow the corporation to finance the insiders' defense during the suitro
this result may readily be accomplished through the retention of common
counsel. In such instances, if the insider defendants are ultimately found
liable, recovery of the corporate funds expended in their defense might prove
impossible.
In summary, the strictures against dual representation enunciated in Lewis
v. Shaffer Stores and Opinion 842 are justified by both the theory and reality
of derivative litigation. But the question of how a court can implement a
decree barring dual representation remains. The only solution presented by
decisions to date is illustrated by the order of the Lewis case: the corporation
was simply advised to "retain independent counsel who have had no previous
connections with the corporation."
57
An alternative solution might be to require the insiders to secure new
counsel, thus permitting the corporation to retain its original counsel. s But
while this procedure removes the outward appearances of dual representation,
the substance of the wrong remains. A residual bias in favor of the individual
defendants might continue to undermine counsel's judgment. This potential
bias would stem from the fact that counsel's first loyalty might remain vith
the directors and officers of the corporation, who have been his principal
contact with the inanimate corporate client in the past. In addition, counsel
51. See generally WAsHINGTON & BIsHoP 75-205.
52. See Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Dorsey Corp., 182 A.2d 647, 654 (Del. Ch.
1962).
53. DEL. CODE Axx. tit. 8, § 122(10) (1953).
54. MODEL BusuIEss CoRPORATION AcT § 4(o).
55. WASamTOx & BisHoP 136.
56. WASHINGToN & Bishop 72, 160. Sections 724(c), 725(c) and 726(a) of the New
York's new Business Corporation Act are unique in permitting the corporation to advance
the insiders' defense expenses, subject of course to repayment should the insiders be found
guilty.
57. 218 F. Supp. 238,240 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
58. This alternative has not been considered in the cases, perhaps because it is usually
counsel's appearance for the corporation which provokes the shareholder's objection to
dual representation.
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might fear that rendering advice antagonistic to the insiders' interests would
impair future relations with his corporate client. For these reasons, the
Lewis decision to have the corporation secure new counsel seems the sounder
alternative.59
Still it must be realized that even the Lewis order provides but a limited
remedy. It is true that the order effectively eradicates any ethical impro-
priety stemming from dual representation and also removes the opportunity
for circumventing the policy of the indemnification statutes. But there remains
a more fundamental problem caused by the potential divergence between the
welfare of the corporation and the personal interests of the officer and director
defendants. Since the officers and directors generally conduct the corporate
entity, there is always a danger that a corporation will be directed to act in
a manner which fails to protect its best interests. This problem, which under-
lies virtually every aspect of derivative litigation, would naturally affect both
the selection and performance of an independent corporate counsel. For ex-
ample, the Lewis court refused to supervise the selection of the independent
counsel. In the view of the court, "the fact that the selection of such independent
counsel will necessarily be made by officers and directors who are defendants"
did not "present any insuperable difficulty."10 Despite the optimism of the
court, it seems likely that in many instances the corporate counsel chosen
will be the mere pawn of the insider defendants. Similarly, under the Lewis
order the directors apparently retain the power to remove the independent
attorney; the threat of dismissal might frequently deter counsel from pro-
viding the fullest protection to the interests of his corporate client.
If the independent counsel is to be safeguarded from pressure to subordi-
nate the welfare of the corporation to the personal interests of the insider
defendants, the Lewis decree must be bolstered. Before formulating a pro-
cedure to this end, however, it is necessary to analyze the various interests
at stake. Certainly a central concern is the protection of the private interests
embodied in the corporate entity. The economic interests of the shareholder
are of primary importance and demand adequate protection, The interests
of the corporation's employees must also be considered. In addition, certain
outside sectors of the community are affected by the institution and outcome
59. Of course, in some instances it may be impractical to require the corporation to
retain new counsel. In particular, where the individual defendants are initially represented
both by outside attorneys and by a corporate counsel whose role in their defense appears
to be relatively minor, courts may be unwilling to go beyond a requirement that corporate
counsel merely refrain from assisting the insider defendants.
60. Lewis v. Shaffer Stores, 218 F. Supp. 238, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). The firm orlgi-
nally representing the Williams Company argued that such a decree "elevated form over
substance." Affidavit of defendant's attorney, March 8, 1963, on file in the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of New York.
It must be realized, however, that the mere act of requiring the corporation to retain
independent counsel removes the "appearance of evil" inherent in the dual representation
situation. To many, the elimination of practices which have the appearance of wrongdoing
is as important to the maintenance of public confidence as the elimination of the actual
abuse. See DRxNKER 115; Opinion 853, 16 REPoRT op N.Y.C.B.A. 488 (1961).
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of derivative suits, and thus may warrant a degree of protection. For example,
a suit enjoining performance of a contract may affect employment and pro-
duction in allied industries. More generally, to the extent that provision for
effective and independent corporate counsel would facilitate the prosecution
of meritorious derivative actions, the conmmunity interest in the prevention
and punishment of corporate dishonesty would be furthered.0 ' A second
major concern is the preservation, wherever feasible, of the integrity of
the corporation as a self-governing unit. The selection of corporate counsel
and the supervision of his duties are clearly within the authority of the board
of directors, who have been duly elected by the shareholders to run the cor-
poration. Since the mere institution of a derivative suit is not a legal determi-
nation that the board is unfit to govern the corporation, it may be questioned
whether judicial restriction of their authority over counsel is justifiable. A
corollary concern, of course, is the competence of the courts to substitute
their judgment, regarding the selection and supervision of corporate counsel,
for that of the directors and officers. Finally, the costs of implementing pro-
cedures to provide the corporation with effective counsel must be taken into
account. Such devices will demand added time and energy from the courts.
At the same time, the financial burden derivative litigation places on the corpo-
ration may increase.
Since the values represented by these concerns all seem deserving of recog-
nition, and since these values are in many respects incompatible, compromise
is necessary in fashioning procedures to assure the corporation independent
and effective counsel.62 The point of departure for these procedures must be
the mode of counsel's selection. It seems essential that the power of impli-
cated directors to choose the corporation's counsel be diminished. If there
is a sufficient number of directors not party to the litigation, the court might
permit only these directors to participate in the selection of counsel. Such
disinterested directors need not be a majority of the board, for a committee
could be allowed to make the selection. Although it may seem superficial to
distinguish between interested and disinterested directors on the basis of
their personal involvement in the suit, this device provides the courts with
61. For a classic statement of the idea that the modem business corporation has a
responsibility not only to its shareholders but also to its employees, customers and the
general public, see Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Tnurtees?, 45 HARv. L
REV. 1145 (1932).
62. The problem of providing the corporation with effective counsel is, of course,
common to all derivative suits. Thus, even in cases in which the corporation is separately
represented ab initio, counsel may in reality be wholly subservient to the director and
officer defendants. See Korman v. Mathias, 32 IlL App. 2d 341, 177 N.E.2d 720 (1961).
The procedures here suggested have been developed as a remedy to dual representation,
and their fullest utility will be in cases where the courts feel that it is both advisable and
practical to resolve dual representation by requiring the corporation to retain new counsel.
Nevertheless, these procedures - with the possible exception of those regulating the
method of counsel's selection - may hopefully submit to a broader application to all de-
rivative suits, including those in which the corporate and insider defendants initially appear
with separate counsel.
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an objective standard by which a director's suitability to participate in the
selection of counsel may be determined. In cases where all or virtually all of
the directors are party to the suit, as was the situation in Lewis, greater ju-
dicial supervision of counsel's selection should be required. A possible ap-
proach would be for the court to appoint counsel after consultation with
the directors and officers of the corporation. Alternatively, appointment might
be made by the court after the corporation, through its directors, submitted
a list of acceptable counsel. In all cases, of course, whether selection be made
by a committee of disinterested directors or by the court, the attorney or firm
engaged should be one that has had no previous dealings with the corporation
or with any of the individual insider defendants.03
Such a solution obviously permits the directors to retain considerable con-
trol over the choice of corporate counsel. In so doing, a degree of protection
of shareholder interests may be sacrificed. But a respect for the traditional
autonomy of the corporation compels this compromise. Any further restric-
tion of the board's authority would also necessitate a corresponding increase
in the court's role in the selection process. Aside from the fact that this would
increase the burden on the courts, there are serious doubts whether the courts,
as an institution, are capable of choosing the attorney who will be most re-
sponsive to a corporation's interests."
Once counsel is selected, provision should be made to insure his retention
for the duration of the litigation. Restriction of the board's power of dismissal
would tend to shield counsel from a major source of pressure to subordinate
the welfare of the corporation to the interests of the insider defendants. Of
course there may be legitimate circumstances in which the corporation should
be permitted to petition for counsel's removal, but such dismissal should be al-
lowed only in instances where the corporation can demonstrate to the court
incompetence or negligence on the part of counsel.
Provision must also be made to allow counsel access to information and
data in the possession of the corporation. Unduly severe restrictions upon
access would render it difficult for counsel to form an intelligent opinion re-
garding the proper position of the corporation in the actual litigation and
in any settlement negotiations. The question then becomes one of determining
what limitation, if any, should be placed upon counsel's right to demand
access. Since an unlimited right of access would impose excessive burdens
on the corporation, and since it might transform counsel into an independent
investigator of all corporate dishonesty, it seems appropriate to limit counsel's
access to information relevant to the transactions involved in the derivative
63. The Lewis court merely required that the independent counsel have had no pre-
vious connection with the corporation. It is clearly more important that counsel have had
no substantial previous dealings with the insider defendants.
64. The largely unhappy experience in other areas in which there has developed a
specialized bar of court appointed attorneys - to wit, bankruptcy and probate - casts
further doubt upon a procedure giving the courts sole responsibility to name corporate
counsel.
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suit. Such provision, of course, may present difficulties of administration.
The limiting requirement of relevance to the subject matter of the suit, how-
ever, will hopefully confine counsel's investigation within reasonable bounds;
in addition, it is probably not unrealistic to place reliance upon the good
faith of counsel to refrain from engaging in an unnecessarily extensive in-
vestigation. Secondly, the limitation of relevancy should provide the courts
with a general standard by which to settle any disputes that might arise
over the counsel's right to access. In defining the scope of the term "rele-
vance," courts will be able to draw helpful analogies from modem civil pro-
cedure acts where similar standards are provided for determination of a
party's right to discovery.6 5 However, in settling access disputes it must be
remembered that the independent counsel, unlike an adversary party, will
have no motive to harass his corporate client by extravagant demands for
information. Counsel's requests for access to information, though requiring
some substantiation regarding relevance, consequently should be viewed with
a presumption of legitimacy.
As a final proposal, the independent counsel should be required to prepare
a brief memorandum setting forth his findings on the merits of the suit and
his opinion as to the proper stance of the corporation in the litigation. Counsel's
report would be filed with the court, and would be made available to all par-
ties to the suit, as well as to any shareholder who requested a copy. The formal
reporting by counsel would serve three purposes. It would subject his work
product to critical public scrutiny, and through this deterrent effect decrease
the possibility that counsel will harbor unspoken bias in favor of the insidersCO
It would formalize and render more public the process by which the cor-
poration is advised of its appropriate role in the litigation, so that the board
might be deterred from rejecting counsel's advice because of self-interest,
at least to the extent of tending to prevent superficially disinterested directors
from determining the corporation's role on the basis of personal ties with
the insider defendants. Lastly, the attorney's memorandum should be included
in any notice sent to the shareholders regarding possible settlement of the
suiL67 This would provide the shareholders with an independent analysis
of both the merits of the suit and the potential recovery that might derive
from a successful prosecution.6 8
65. See FE-D. R. Civ. P. 26(b) & 34.
66. In this respect, the independent counsel's memorandum opinion would be roughly
analogous to the opinion prepared by a public accountant certifying a financial statement.
To be meaningful, an accountant's certificate must be the work of an independent expert.
And perhaps the most effective insurance that the certificate will be the product of in-
dependence is the fact that it is available to pfiblic scrutiny, with the consequent possi-
bility that any false or misleading practice may be brought to light.
67. See note 48 supra.
68. The memorandum opinion of the independent counsel bears certain similarities to
a procedure that may be instituted by the Board of Trade in Great Britain. In a variety
of circumstances - for example, where there are indications of oppression of minority
shareholders or fraud or misconduct by the directors - the board may appoint an inspector
to investigate the affairs of the company. Companies Act, 1943, §§ 164-75. The inspector,
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Hopefully these procedures will safeguard the selection and enhance the
effectiveness of corporate counsel in derivative actions, thus affording an
added measure of protection to the various interests represented by and de-
pendent upon the corporation. It might be argued that more complete pro-
tection of these interests could be achieved by adding to the current proposal
provisions to restrict the power of the board to reject the advice of the inde-
pendent counsel. For example, in cases where there is no disinterested majority
of directors the court might rule that the opinion of counsel would be binding
upon the board. Alternatively, the court could appoint a receiver or guardian
ad litem for the corporation wherever the board refused to accept the recom-
mendations of counsel. Such procedures, however, mark a drastic inroad
upon the autonomy of the corporation as they would, in effect, oust the board
of directors from control of the litigation prior to a legal determination of the
charges of wrongdoing. Nor is it clear, considering the important business
judgments involved, that an attorney would be competent, or even willing,
to exercise sole responsibility for determining the corporation's role in the
litigation. These procedures would also place added burdens, especially in
terms of expense, upon both courts and corporations. Weighing these con-
siderations, it seems unwise to restrict the board's authority to reject the
opinion of independent counsel.69 Within the framework of present derivative
litigation the potential gains that might be derived from such a procedure
are not commensurate with the costs that would be incurred.
who is generally an independent barrister, solicitor, or accountant, reports to the board,
and normally the report is published. Id. at § 168. As Gower points out, the inspector's
report "alone may cause the wrong to be remedied," but "if this does not suffice the report
should at least provide the stockholder with essential ammunition." Gower, Some Con-
trasts Between British and Aoierican Corporation Law, 69 HARV. L, Rrv. 1369, 1388
(1956).
See also McDaniel, Ethical Problems of Counsel for Big Business: Thc Burdenl of
Resolving Conflicting Interests, 38 A.B.A.J. 205, 207 (1952).
69. Admittedly, an anomalous situation may arise should the board of directors reject
the memorandum opinion, for the independent counsel might be asked to represent the
corporation in court in a manner which is inconsistent with his recommendations. It is
not uncommon, however, for lawyers to continue to represent clients who have rejected
their advice. The opinion envisaged in the current proposal would, of course, have the
unique attribute of being filed in court and made available to the shareholders; but since
all should be aware of counsel's obligation to follow the direction of the board, ally vari-
ance between the memorandum opinion and counsel's appearance for the corporation should
be accepted as a matter of course.
The various means which might be employed to eliminate this possible anomaly in
counsel's role would seriously detract from the proposals suggested in this Note. One
means would be to remove the board's powers to reject counsel's opinion, As already
noted, this seems inadvisable. A second means would be to allow the corporation to retain
a new attorney should the independent counsel's opinion be rejected. But such a procedure
would involve additional and unnecessary expense to the corporation. Finally, the pro-
vision making counsel's opinion available to the court and shareholders might be dispensed
with. It is submitted, however, that the need for public scrutiny of the memorandum
opinion far outweighs the need to eliminate the perceived minor inconsistencies in counsel's
role.
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